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1 INTRODUCTION 
Since 2009, the gradual establishment of four so-called EU macro-regions has signalled a more 
comprehensive macro-regional strategy at the EU level. Up until now, such macro-regions have been 
established in four European areas: the Baltic Sea (2009), the Danube river (2010), the Adriatic and Ionian 
Seas (2014) and the Alpine mountains (2015). Since they have only been in place for about 2 to 7 years, 
macro-regions can still be considered a very recent phenomenon. Hence a systematic empirical overview 
of them is still in a primary stage (e.g. EC, 2016a). 
When EU macro-regions were first launched, they were defined as areas ‘covering a number of 
administrative regions but with sufficient issues in common to justify a single strategic approach’ (EC, 
2009: 5). From this definition, two elements are apparent. Firstly, EU macro-regions are composed of a 
number of smaller (regions or municipalities) or larger (nation-states) territorial entities each of them 
addressing their respective desires. Secondly, EU macro-regions correspond to areas with common 
issues, which may be geographical or sectoral in nature. These issues need a strategic approach in order 
to be addressed. Such an approach demands ‘integrated frameworks [which help] to identify needs and 
allocate available resources’, the so-called EU macro-regional strategies (Samecki, 2009: 1). Based on 
these two elements, it is fair to conclude that EU macro-regions encompass both a territorial and a 
functional dimension. Therefore, I argue that macro-regions are hybrid forms of organization balancing 
between these two dimensions. 
Furthermore, existing macro-regions face various issues; they have different histories, political 
backgrounds, normative viewpoints and cultural preferences. In addition, they are brought into practice by 
a huge variety of actors and institutions. As a result, the way in which various macro-regions 
accommodate both dimensions is hypothesized to vary greatly. Hence, the underlying objective of this 
paper is to understand the hybrid nature of EU macro-regions and how they balance between the territorial 
and functional interdependences. 
In order to address this question, I aim, first, to give an overview of the current state of the four existing 
macro-regions and, second, illustrate their hybrid nature by focusing on three aspects: 1) the pre-existing 
forms of cooperation and geo-political backgrounds these macro-regions build upon, 2) the substantive 
issues these macro-regions are dealing with, and 3) the governance structures they have set up. Both 
steps are the outcome of a thorough investigation of relevant EU and ‘macro-regional’ documents as well 
as interviews with a selective number of EU, cross-regional and national officials
1
. 
 
2 THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL POSITIONING 
2.1 MACRO-REGIONS AS TERRITORIAL AND FUNCTIONAL SPACES 
In the existing literature, the understanding of EU macro-regions has been developed by a number of 
considerations. From an EU perspective, macro-regional strategies are considered a form of bottom-up 
and place-based policy (Samecki, 2009; Barca, 2009), which has to be designed and implemented 
predominantly by its constituents. Another consideration comes from Stocchiero (2010) who welcomed the 
initiation of macro-regions by arguing that they constitute an ‘interesting political experiment’ comprising 
actors from various territorial levels (Stocchiero, 2010: 3). Furthermore, Schymik (2011) recognized the 
territorial and functional aspects of macro-regions by seeing them as a ‘model experiment of macro-
regional strategy’ (Schymik, 2011: 5). Similarly, Dühr (2011) suggested that ‘the argument for territorial and 
                                                            
1
 A list of interviewees is available on demand. 
 1668 
 
functional interrelations is at the heart of the EU macro-regional strategies’ by arguing that macro-regions 
provide an additional governance layer for transnational cooperation (Dühr, 2011: 38). Lastly, Stead (2014) 
links macro-regions with the concept of soft spaces ‘in terms of resource efficiency and policy coordination 
and integration’ (Stead, 2014: 687). Although these considerations do refer to some functional and 
territorial aspects of macro-regions, they mainly point out their experimental substance. Interestingly, they 
do not address the issue of how these macro-regions balance between those aspects and how the state of 
macro-regions is affected by those aspects. 
The following contributions, however, do connect to the distinction between territorial and functional 
organization within EU macro-regions. For example, Kern and Gänzle (2013) suggest that EU macro-
regions may be affected by ‘a shift from territorial to functional regions’ (Kern and Gänzle, 2013: 10). In 
their terms, such a shift is described by the process of macro-regionalization and it affects the ‘spatial 
dimension, boundaries, institutional set-up and governance’ of macro-regions (ibid). As a result, macro-
regions differ from territorial regions in their demarcation (based on functional interdependencies), shifting 
boundaries (transcending existing territorial boundaries), policy-specific institutional arrangements and 
new forms of functional governance. 
Furthermore, Blatter (2004) elaborates the distinction between territorial and functional governance. To 
develop this distinction, he analyses categories such as ‘the structural pattern of interaction, sectoral 
differentiation, functional scope, geographic scale, and institutional stability’ (Blatter, 2004: 533). Based on 
them, he concludes that, in the ideal type of territorial governance, a central authority is charged with top-
down interactions across the organizational structure (usually the nation-state); actors from the public 
sector dominate the participation in general-purpose institutions, which have clear boundaries across time 
and space. In contrast, the ideal type of functional governance encompasses networks interacting 
horizontally, incorporating both public and non-public actors, working in task-specific issues beyond 
concrete territorial, time and space boundaries. 
 
2.2 AN ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK TO STUDY EU MACRO-REGIONS 
For the purposes of this study, I recognize the experimental character which macro-regions have thus far, 
however I regard their hybrid nature balancing between the territorial and functional dimension. To 
illustrate this hybrid nature of EU macro-regions, I suggest an assembled analytical framework. This 
framework is inspired by the contributions made by Kern and Gänzle (2013) and Blatter (2004), and it 
addresses two elements. The first element highlights the role of pre-existing institutions in mobilizing 
macro-regional processes, developing them and making them work. In fact, EU macro-regions build on 
pre-existing institutional arrangements, but the macro-regional processes themselves may, in turn, be 
affected by the pre-existing institutional arrangements. It is exactly because of this reason that ‘macro-
regional strategies need to be embedded in the already existing institutions operating at the macro-
regional level’ (Kern and Gänzle, 2013: 12). Yet, the second element shows the analytical pertinence of 
substantive scope and governance of EU macro-regions. This is because EU macro-regions result in a 
sort of new policies and governance structures. Drawing upon Blatter (2004) and Kern and Gänzle (2013), 
the substantial scope of EU macro-regions may refer to functional goals, tasks, boundaries or issues which 
territorial or functional regions have to deal with, while governance of EU macro-regions can be seen in the 
new forms of governance structures established in territorial or functional regions. 
Hence, in order to understand how macro-regions are hybrid models balancing between their territorial or 
functional interdependencies, I focus on three aspects, namely 1) pre-existing institutions, 2) substantive 
content of macro-regional strategies, and 3) governance structures. To operationalize the three aspects, 
the first aspect analyzes the institutional and historical background which surrounds existing EU macro-
regions. This includes an overview of pre-existing forms of cooperation preceded by a short overview of 
historical milestones determining the status of cooperation which have been in place before the launch of 
EU macro-regions. The second aspect concerns the substantial issues such as the scope, objectives, 
drivers and challenges attached to existing EU macro-regional strategies. The third aspect covers the 
organizational issues such as what governance mechanisms have been created and what issues they 
struggle with. 
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3 AN OVERVIEW OF THE CURRENT STATE OF EU MACRO-REGIONS
1
 
BALTIC SEA REGION 
The EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR) can be traced back to 2006, when a report of the 
European Parliament called for a strategy for the Baltic region as a means to reinforce the regional 
cooperation of countries in the Baltics (EP, 2006). Following that, the European Commission (EC) released 
the Communication and the Action Plan for the EUSBSR in June 2009 and the European Council officially 
endorsed the Strategy in October 2009. The EUSBSR was the first EU macro-regional strategy and 
although it started as a purely European strategy including 8 EU member states, it was soon widened to 
involve 4 non-EU countries. It addresses 3 main objectives, namely ‘save the sea’, ‘increase prosperity’ 
and ‘connect the region’ which are further specified in 13 Policy Areas and 4 Horizontal Actions. At the end 
of the day, all these strategy features aim to develop implementation projects (flagship projects). 
In order to make the EUSBSR work, various key actors are currently involved. Firstly, the European 
Commission holds a strategic role in facilitating the EUSBSR. Secondly, national coordinators are 
responsible for coordinating the EUSBSR at the national ministries level, while the coordinators of policy 
areas and coordinators of horizontal actions are in charge of the coordination of specific thematic actions 
(under Policy Areas and Horizontal Actions of EUSBSR). Furthermore, flagship leaders make EUSBSR 
projects run, while managing authorities of various funding programmes aim at ensuring complementarities 
between EUSBSR projects and other existing programmes. These actors get involved in or support the 
workings of EUSBSR governance mechanisms. In brief, the three components of the EUSBSR 
governance are: 1) the National Coordinators Group, 2) the Policy Area Steering Committee/Coordination 
Group, and 3) the Horizontal Action Steering Group. 
 
DANUBE REGION 
The EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR) was initiated, primarily by the efforts of Austria and 
Romania, as a new project of regional cooperation (Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010). The 
EUSDR was adopted by the EC in December 2010 and endorsed by the European Council in April 2011. 
The Strategy involves 9 EU and 5 non-EU countries and it addresses 4 main objectives, namely 
‘connecting the region’, ‘protecting the environment’, ‘strengthening the region’, and ‘building prosperity’. 
Regarding the main actors involved in EUSDR, the European Commission offers strategic coordination 
and administrative support. In turn, National Coordinators (NCs) and Policy Area Coordinators (PACs) are 
in charge of coordination at the national and inter-ministerial level. In order to facilitate the coordination 
and communication between project experts and policy makers, the Danube Strategy Point (DSP) was 
established in 2015. Building on the involvement and expertise of actors, the EUSDR governance is 
organized around three components, namely 1) the Meetings of National Coordinators, and 2) the Priority 
Area Steering Groups, while 3) the Danube Strategy Point has got a more intermediate role between the 
other two components as well as the EC services. 
 
ADRIATIC-IONIAN REGION 
In 2014, the EU Strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian Region (EUSAIR) was launched as a tool for building 
prosperity in the region alongside the integration process of the Western Balkans (EC, 2014a). The EC 
adopted the EUSAIR Communication and its accompanied Action Plan in June 2014, while the European 
Council endorsed the documents in October 2014. EUSAIR involves 4 EU and 4 non-EU countries and 
aims at four basic areas of cooperation, namely ‘blue growth’, ‘connecting the region’, ‘environmental 
quality’, and ‘sustainable tourism’. 
The EUSAIR benefits from the EC support and the involvement of other actors. The EC services help the 
development of EUSAIR as facilitators and policy coordinators. National Coordinators supported by other 
institutions ensure the coordination and policy making at the macro-regional level. Another significant body 
at this level is the Adriatic Ionian Council, which informs the coordination of national agendas regarding 
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EUSAIR among the Foreign Affairs ministers. Other officials at the national, inter-ministerial and regional 
levels (namely the Coordinators of Thematic Steering Groups) are engaged in running and implementing 
EUSAIR in their respective policy areas. Lastly, managing authorities of European programmes take part 
in the implementation/financing of EUSAIR projects. In terms of governance, EUSAIR consists of three 
main components: 1) the Governing Board, which is the main body coordinating representatives across 
the national level, and 2) the Thematic Steering Groups in charge of EUSAIR coordination and 
implementation, while 3) the EUSAIR Facility Point is anticipated to be an intermediate mechanism to 
support the previous two components and the EC services. 
 
ALPINE REGION 
More recently, the EU Strategy for the Alpine Region (EUSALP) was released by the European 
Commission in November 2015 and endorsed by the European Council in June 2016. It is perceived to be 
an EU laboratory for effective cross-sectorial and multi-level governance (EC, 2015a). The Strategy is 
composed of 5 EU and 2 non-EU countries which target at three basic areas of cooperation: sustainable 
growth and innovation, connectivity and sustainability. 
The EUSALP is quite unique in terms of the actors’ involvement. The EC services are present in order to 
provide strategic coordination and facilitation. National representatives get involved in various governance 
arrangements (e.g. Executive Board), but, due to their empowered role, actors from the regional 
administrations are of particular importance in EUSALP. Lastly, the Alpine Convention and the Interreg 
Alpine Space Programme participate as observers to support the implementation of EUSALP. After all, the 
governance structure of EUSALP includes: 1) the General Assembly, where EC, national and regional 
representatives meet in order to set the political agenda, 2) the Executive Board which is in charge of the 
overall coordination of EUSALP, and 3) the Actions Groups in charge of the implementation of EUSALP. 
 
4 COMPARING THE CURRENT ISSUES OF EU MACRO-REGIONS
1
 
4.1 PRE-EXISTING INSTITUTIONS 
BALTIC SEA REGION 
Although the Baltic Sea states were politically divided during the largest part of the 20th century, they 
targeted to cooperate according to the provisions of the Helsinki Convention on the marine environment 
already in 1974. However, this was not realized until the 1992 convention. Under this convention, the 
Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) was established in 1995 to address a good environmental status in the 
Baltic Sea. This body has been a key contributor with regard to sea matters, while its relevance and 
expertise has resulted to the ‘Baltic Sea Action Plan’ in 2007, a plan for the restoration of the ecological 
status of the Baltic marine environment until 2021. Similarly, the VASAB has been another crucial actor in 
the Baltic Sea cooperation in the field of spatial planning. Its activities can be traced back in 1992, while it 
is currently active in the framework of the Baltic macro-region by offering its expertise on various spatially 
related sectors. These two pre-existing institutions indicate that functional interdependences have been 
drivers of cooperation in the Baltic Region already for a long time. Nevertheless, political cooperation has 
gradually emerged since the 1990s, indicating territorial interdependencies in the Baltic Region as well. 
From this point of view, the Northern Dimension (ND) and the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) are 
important frameworks. On the one hand, the ND constitutes a tool for political dialogue and cooperation of 
the EU member states with neighbouring countries commenced in 1999 and extended in 2006 in order to 
frame the political cooperation in the Baltics. On the other hand, this political cooperation is enhanced by 
the CBSS, an intergovernmental body among Baltic states operating since 1992. The CBSS supports joint 
activities in a variety of policy areas, and it is currently involved in the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea 
Region in the fields of security, climate change and neighbour relations. 
Lately, the EU strategy for the Baltic Sea region (EUSBSR) was suggested to reinforce the regional 
cooperation of institutions in the Baltics countries (EP, 2006). This goal seems to be achieved according to 
a recent EC report, which states that the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region has been a development 
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which ‘reinforces’ and even ‘deepens’ the cooperation between existing regional frameworks (e.g. 
HELCOM and ND) as well as supports ‘the establishment of new networks and joint initiatives’ (EC, 2016b: 
11). It has also provided ‘a new stimulus to put back on the political agenda some topics of regional 
importance’ (EC, 2016b: 13-14). Although the launch of EUSBSR may seem a development based on 
territorial drivers, it is equally dependent on functional needs. Based on empirical evidence, the EUSBSR 
is seen ‘to help the systematic cooperation of existing institutions’ and ‘to create a hub of knowledge’ 
deriving from existing expertise (Interview 4). This expertise certainly comes from ‘a number of ‘Pan-Baltic 
organizations’ which contribute to EUSBSR (Interview 9). In addition, respondents suggest that while pre-
existing institutions (especially under HELCOM) offered significant work of political organization, the 
EUSBSR has contributed to policy coordination among participating countries and pre-existing cooperation 
arrangements (Interview 4). As an example, the Annual Fora organized by EUSBSR provide arenas for 
interaction between ‘pre-existing organizations [to] share their views’ (Interview 9). 
 
DANUBE REGION 
The Danube region is characterized by a unique geographical element (the Danube river) as well as 
fundamental transitions in political conditions of its constituent states. Illustrating its functional drivers, 
regional cooperation across the Danube river has been significant in the area of navigation since 1948. For 
almost seventy years, the Danube Commission has been a key actor to ensure a free navigation system in 
the Danube. Following the same functional logic, the International Commission for the Protection of the 
Danube River (ICPDR) and the International Sava River Basin Commission (ISRBC) operate, since 1998 
and 2005 respectively, in order to support the navigation and sustainable water management in the 
Danube and Sava river basins. More recently, however, regional cooperation has also been developing to 
support stability and integration of Danube countries, especially the Eastern European countries in 
transition. Serving a more territorial scope, the Central Europe Initiative (CEI), the Danube Countries 
Working Group (ARGE Donauländer) and the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) have been supporting 
the Danube states in their trajectory to increase capacity building and facilitate regional cooperation in the 
matters of economy, society, energy, transportation and tourism among others. 
Since 2010, the emergence of the EU strategy for the Danube region (EUSDR) has brought a new 
momentum of regional cooperation among institutions and countries in the Danube region. Due to the 
EUSDR, for example, the ‘culture of cooperation’ in the Danube region has been improved (EC, 2016b: 
26). This improvement predominantly comes from functional drivers. As mentioned by interviewees, ‘there 
was no systematic cooperation in some policy areas before, but they exist now (e.g. education, 
entrepreneurship)’ (Interview 2). Similarly, ‘new organizations get organized’ such as networks of 
researchers (Interview 5). Together with improved cooperation, a growing ‘political relevance’ of the region 
is recognized (EC, 2016b: 27), however, the main challenge of EUSDR is considered to be ‘how to avoid 
duplication (e.g. ICDRP)’ without having parallel structures working on the same issues (Interview 2). 
 
ADRIATIC-IONIAN REGION 
The Adriatic-Ionian region displays its own specificities due to its very diverse and delicate geopolitical 
space, as overwhelmingly illustrated by the collapse of the Soviet Union, the transition to an open 
economy, the partition of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo conflicts. In their effort to leave behind old conflicts 
and cease new opportunities, the Adriatic-Ionian countries tried to establish transnational cooperation 
starting from the political domain. As a result, a major accomplishment in this region was the creation of 
the Adriatic and Ionian Initiative (AII). This is an intergovernmental body created in 1999 in order to bolster 
regional cooperation and promote political and economic stability in the area. Hence, the AII mainly 
reflects a form of territorial cooperation aiming to address functional issues. Later, the AII constituted the 
forerunner of the Adriatic-Ionian macro-region. Following the AII, additional cooperation spinoffs were 
established since 1990 in order to address a more functional imperatives (e.g. among economic 
chambers, universities and local municipalities). From a similar perspective, cooperation among the 
Adriatic and Ionian regions was also supported by the CPMR Inter-Mediterranean Commission since 1990 
and the Adriatic-Ionian Euro-region since 2005. 
Since 2014, the EU strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian Region (EUSAIR) was initiated and has benefitted from 
the experiences of the Adriatic-Ionian Initiative, its spin-off organizations and cooperation structures 
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operating in the Mediterranean space (EC, 2016b: 38-40). Along the same lines, interviews suggest that 
‘all these networks are very useful for the future development of the Strategy… because all these networks 
showed that something is needed’ as well as ‘all pre-existing structures made some kind of seeds…’ 
(Interview 7). However, we should be aware that other interview responses pointing to the Adriatic Ionian 
case suggest that cooperation of pre-existing institutions under EUSAIR entails ‘nothing really 
revolutionary’ and ‘no really new ways of operating’ (Interview 8). 
 
ALPINE REGION 
The Alpine area can be considered as a different case in contrast to other macro-regions in geopolitical 
and geographical terms. It has been a relatively stable and prosperous area throughout the last few 
centuries, while countries shaping the Alpine region retain a long tradition in transnational cooperation with 
a common view over the good condition of the mountain environment and its ecosystems. From a more 
territorial perspective, the Alpine Convention has been a major development in the region by targeting to 
the preservation and protection of the Alps since 1995. Alpine Convention is an international treaty 
covering all major areas of interests of Alpine states. Compared to the Alpine Convention, the International 
Commission for the Protection of the Alps (CIPRA) has been a wide network of institutions, which have 
been focusing on the protection and sustainable development of the Alps from a more functional 
perspective. Already since 1952, CIPRA advocates the added value of regional cooperation among the 
Alpine regions and surrounding areas in the fields of biodiversity and landscape, climate and energy, 
transport and mobility as well as youth-related issues. 
Only very recently, the EU strategy for the Alpine Region (EUSALP) has emerged as an additional layer of 
coordination among institutions in the Alpine space. Since its launch, the EUSALP is expected to ‘ensure 
their participation, where relevant, in order to build on existing expertise and to organize possible 
synergies among themselves’ (EC, 2016b: 50). However, the EUSALP seems to be actually situated within 
an already institutionally overloaded arena comprising of the Alpine Convention and numerous sub-
national regions (Interview 5). Against this background, the Alpine Convention is currently involved in 
EUSALP by dealing with the “Preservation and valorisation of natural resources” and supporting other 
policy areas as well, while CIPRA’s involvement in EUSALP is still a process in progress (Interview 5). 
 
4.2 SUBSTANTIVE CONTENT OF MACRO-REGIONAL STRATEGIES
1
 
BALTIC SEA REGION 
The substantive scope of EUSBSR has been described to reinforce existing cooperation in the Baltic Sea 
region. Following this, the Baltic Sea region was viewed by its constituents as an ideal case to test new 
approaches of regional cooperation and regional governance which can be further copied by other macro-
regions. However, such a view was stimulated by two main drivers. The first and foremost driver of 
EUSBSR was the deteriorating condition of the Baltic Sea and its water environment. The improvement of 
such a water environment was recognized as a challenge shared by all countries of the Baltic macro-
region, illustrating their significant interdependence with it. Hence, the so-called ‘Cleaning the Sea’ goal, 
was considered a sensitive and actual issue to be addressed by the EUSBSR, and it has been 
reconfirmed as ‘a core field’ in the Strategy as well (EC, 2016b: 16; Interview 5; Interview 9). Secondarily, 
there are also geopolitical drivers justifying the emergence of EUSBSR (Interview 5). Although the Baltic 
Sea macro-region was largely initiated as a merely European project, it was soon widened by the 
participation of Russia and other countries of the Nordic arc. This momentum has brought high 
expectations regarding the usefulness of EUSBSR, however evidence remains divided. On the one hand, 
it is argued that the visibility and understanding of the role, purpose and added value of the EUSBSR ‘is 
still not sufficient’ (EC, 2016b: 17). On the other hand, it is supported that actors saw the added value of 
EUSBSR due to the fact that cooperation in the Baltics was already more coordinated than other 
cooperation frameworks (Interview 3), as well as institutions identified new opportunities ‘to get role again’ 
(Interview 5). 
                                                            
1
 Four macro-regional strategies have been launched so far: the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR), the 
EU Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR), the EU Strategy for the Adriatic-Ionian Region (EUSAIR) and the EU 
Strategy for the Alpine Region (EUSALP).  
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DANUBE REGION 
Similar to the EUSBSR, the overall scope of EUSDR was conceived as a new project of regional 
cooperation. The main trigger which justified or even hastened the initiation of EUSDR was the issue of 
floods and their implications to navigation of ships within Danube in 2007. To illustrate this issue, 
interviewees note that 'there was an actual problem (that of floods) and flood management required a 
transnational perspective’ (Interview 2). Yet, the EUSDR’s objective lies on a vision of building prosperity 
realized by a context-specific sub-goals such as supporting connectivity, attractiveness, environmental 
conditions, and ecosystems. In that sense, the Danube macro-region seems to be equally motivated by 
new opportunities to be taken by countries across Danube. These two elements suggest that functional 
interdependencies are clear drivers for EUSDR. Yet, the EUSDR instead of depending purely on 
functionalities, it also adds the territorial element of integration of the Western Balkans. In doing so, 
political motives were crucial triggers. To illustrate this, empirical interviews suggest that ‘the Danube 
macro-region helps the cooperation of operational level actors without the need of legal complications’ 
(Interview 2), element which provides a certain degree of flexibility in joint action and project development 
among countries. Although political motives may be drivers in favour of EUSDR, an emerging risk is the 
fading political discourses illustrated by ‘the EUSDR seems to be given a lower priority in the political 
narrative at national level’ (EC, 2016b: 30). Additional substantive challenges in the development of 
EUSDR relate to how ‘to define the actual joint action or what is really the focus’ and how to achieve ‘more 
concrete outputs’ (Interview 2). 
 
ADRIATIC-IONIAN REGION 
The overarching scope of EUSAIR is to primarily address the prosperity challenge and, secondarily, the 
integration challenge. Regarding the first challenge, the EUSAIR’s ultimate goal is to promote economic 
and social prosperity by supporting attractiveness, connectivity, competitiveness and the marine 
environment in the region. Certainly, this goal suggests a sort of vision based on the economic and social 
interdependencies between the Adriatic-Ionian macro-regions. It is partly inspired by the logic and 
objectives of the preceding EU sea-level strategy in the Adriatic-Ionian region. Hence, the main motives for 
cooperation under EUSAIR have been instigated by sectoral challenges. Regarding the second challenge, 
the accession and integration processes of Western Balkans are significant to EUSAIR. The crucial issue 
in such processes is the Adriatic-Ionian countries to ‘re-start talking’, illustrating the territorial dimension of 
the EUSAIR content. Interestingly, in such processes the ‘EC seems to have played a more active role’ as 
well (Interview 3). This last point is partly related to a key issue in the content of EUSAIR, which is an 
important gap between the political commitment expressed by the high/ministerial level and the sequential 
support of their subjected administrations. Although EUSAIR is ‘still in its initial phase’ (EC, 2016b: 36), the 
above-mentioned issue is often attributed to the ‘lack of adequate human, financial, administrative and 
technical resources’ as well as ‘the lack of leadership, commitment and ownership’ among the participating 
administrations (EC, 2016b: 41). All these causes, nevertheless, reflect both an organizational/functional 
and a territorial/political nature of problems emerging in the EUSAIR. 
 
ALPINE REGION 
In the EUSALP, attention is mainly stressed to ensuring an effective horizontal (across sectors) and 
vertical (between territorial levels) governance of the macro-regional project. The Alpine macro-region 
seems to be predominantly motivated by seizing further opportunities, similarly to the Danube case. These 
opportunities pinpoint to functional interdependencies such as environmental, social and economic 
concerns in the Alpine mountains. As a result, the main objective of EUSALP depicts a vision of building 
prosperity by supporting attractiveness, competitiveness, connectivity and environmental conditions. 
However, the main difference compared to other macro-regions is the enhanced role of sub-national 
regions instead of national states (Interview 3). As in the EUSAIR case, the EUSALP is considered to be 
‘still in an initial stage’ (EC, 2016b: 46), and the crucial issue to EUSALP success is the ‘gap between the 
Strategy and funding opportunities’ (EC, 2016b: 49). As such, this gap seems to be explained by ‘[the] 
structures, frameworks and timeframes [of existing programmes, which are] often not compatible with the 
needs of a macro-regional strategy’ (ibid). 
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CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES 
Empirical research highlights a number of issues cutting across the content of all existing macro-regional 
strategies. The first issue refers how macro-regional strategies themselves are perceived. For example, 
macro-regional strategies are perceived as ‘a platform of cooperation at the transnational level in order to 
avoid duplications’ (Interview 3). In a similar logic, they are seen as ‘frameworks of cooperation [offering] 
opportunities for strategic cooperation’ to those involved (Interview 5). The second issue relates to the 
involvement of actors. Actors get motivated to develop macro-regional strategies ‘because they are 
confronted with things that they cannot deal individually’ (Interview 4). The last issue refers to a lack of 
clarity persisting across macro-regions. Illustrative quotes demonstrate a lack of clarity regarding ‘what is 
really the focus’ (Interview 2), ‘what they wish to achieve or no common vision’ (Interview 4; Interview 3), 
‘their process, scope and who is involved’ (Interview 9). All three issues, however, indicate a consideration 
of macro-regional strategies according to their functional aspects rather than any territorial concern. 
 
4.3 GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
1
 
POLITICAL LEVEL 
The highest level of macro-regional governance (political level) performs quite similar patterns across all 
existing macro-regions. More specifically, three main bodies inform the design and revision of macro-
regional strategies, namely the European Commission, the European Council, and the High-level Group 
for macro-regions. Initially, the EC holds the strategic coordination and facilitation of macro-regional 
strategies through its various Directorate-Generals (DGs). Its role lies to highlight the functional character 
of macro-regional strategies by ensuring the efficient coordination of actors at the macro-regional level. 
Furthermore, the European Council is responsible to ensure domestic political commitment, facilitate the 
efficient allocation of tasks and participation of relevant institutions, and raise visibility of macro-regional 
actions. Accordingly, major political decisions such as the revision of Action Plans are made at this high-
political level. Additionally, the high-level group plays an advisory role to EC and Council as well as 
facilitates the exchange of knowledge and experiences between macro-regions. 
Up to date, the role of EC, and DG-Regio in particular, has been significant to the get the macro-regional 
strategies started as well as make them work. Empirical evidence supports the argument that EC held the 
role of strategic coordinator and main facilitator in existing macro-regions, especially during their initial 
stages. In the Adriatic-Ionian case, for example, extra efforts have been devised in order to set the 
governance mechanisms and help them produce their initial results. Furthermore, the European Council 
has played a role in initiating macro-regional strategies, endorsing European Commission’s workings, 
raising key horizontal issues of macro-regions (such as governance) and ensuring political commitment in 
favour of the development of macro-regional strategies. A slight difference to this pattern of high-level 
processes is the Alpine case, which is the only macro-region with a General Assembly. In this case, the 
EUSALP Assembly is a political body composed by EC, national and regional representatives, and the 
Alpine Convention (as observer). Although it may suggest a territorial dimension in EUSALP governance, 
its main task is to set the general political guidelines for EUSALP. 
 
COORDINATION LEVEL 
At the coordination level, a mechanism of National Coordinators is assigned across all macro-regions with 
coordination and visibility tasks. The main tasks of National Coordinators are, for example, to represent 
their respective countries in official meetings, find the most relevant delegators of their national 
administrations to develop and implement macro-regional strategies, coordinate the workings of their 
                                                            
1
 The analysis under this aspect is formulated slightly differently than the previous aspects. This is because the basic 
framework determining the governance of macro-regions has been sketched by the EC in a recent report (EC, 2014b). 
This governance report can be considered a milestone because it establishes three distinct levels of operation, namely 
the political, coordination and implementation. Having this in mind, the governance structures of macro-regions are 
analyzed in this sub-section based on these three analytical levels (see also Tables 1 and 2, Annex) supplemented by 
some complementary remarks on specific macro-regions.  
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subjected mechanisms (e.g. policy area coordinators), and finally make the results visible to those involved 
and the public. In most macro-regional strategies, such a coordination structure was established after the 
actual launch of macro-regional strategies, except the Alpine case. In this particular case, the so-called 
Steering Committee was responsible to prepare the macro-regional strategy following the resolution and 
the mandate declared by the participating countries in 2012 and 2013 respectively (EUSALP, 2013; 
EUSALP, 2014). This distinctive approach shows a more territorial approach in the EUSALP, at least at its 
early stage. 
In order to support National Coordinators in their tasks, additional coordination structures have created at 
the national level (e.g. EUSBSR, EUSDR, EUSALP) as well as new working structures have been 
emerged at the implementation level. (EC, 2016b: 10, 27-28, 47). An example of such structures is a pilot 
European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) managing authorities’ network established in the EUSBSR 
in 2016. Nevertheless, the Danube and Adriatic-Ionian macro-regional strategies have requested the 
establishment of a mediatory body to support the coordination and implementation of their macro-regional 
strategies, namely the Danube Strategy Point (DSP) and the EUSAIR Facility Point. Lately, a similar 
discussion is under way in the EUSALP (EC, 2016b:48). Regarding the former body, the DSP was created 
to harmonize the coordination of national and policy area coordinators in several functions. These 
functions relate to support the implementation, communication and monitoring between EUSDR policy 
areas and National Coordinators as well as enhance linkages between EUSDR and Interreg programmes 
(Interview 2; Interview 5). With regard to the second body, it is envisaged as a support system to help 
governance and coordination between EUSAIR National Coordinators, EUSAIR implementation bodies 
and EC services (Interview 1). Interestingly enough, the DSP was realized within a very short period of 
time (approximately one year since its conception), whereas EUSAIR Facility Point is still in progress 
(almost two years after its conception). In spite of that, both the DSP and the EUAIR Facility Point indicate 
a need to improve the functional dimension of macro-regional governance. 
 
IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL 
Lastly, the implementation level seems to be the most crucial part of macro-regional strategies, since the 
success at this level determines the continuity of the entire Strategies (Cretu speech, 2016). To support 
implementation, various implementation mechanisms have been established across macro-regions. These 
mechanisms reflect a functional type of governance (Blatter, 2004) because they are created in order to 
address policy-specific or action-specific issues (e.g. Steering Groups or Action Groups). Similarly, 
horizontal or cross-cutting issues are managed by similar type or organizations. 
However, although creating and experimenting in new structures is evident, a number of organization 
dysfunctionalities still persist both at the coordination and the implementation level. A first issue is the lack 
of availability of funding sources. Statements such as ‘not all countries have allocated sufficient resources’ 
are illustrative to what is happening in the EUSBSR and EUSAIR cases (EC, 2016b: 16; Interview 1). A 
second issue is the differential support between the political representatives and the implementers of the 
macro-regional strategies. This issue can be observed in different occasions such as, in the EUSBSR, ‘no 
clear mandates to representatives’ or, in the EUSDR, ‘a gap between the formal political support and the 
substantial support by national administrations’ is recognized (EC, 2016b: 16, 31). Similar occasions hold 
in the EUSAIR case as well (Interview 1). A third issue is described by the lack of compatibility between 
the implementation structures of macro-regional strategies and the implementation structures of Interreg 
programmes (Interview 3, 4, 8). To illustrate this through the EUSDR, there is a ‘gap between the Strategy 
and the programmes, which too often divides managing authorities and officials in charge for the EUSDR’ 
(EC, 2016b: 32). Against this issue, actors have already warned that ‘as long as existing institutions (EU, 
national, local) do not recognize the work done by macro-regional structures, macro-regional strategies will 
be struggling’ (Interview 4). Finally, additional challenges arise with regard to the actors involved and the 
tasks allocated to them. For example, the allocation of tasks has been an issue for clarification both for 
coordination structures as well as those implementing actual projects. To resolve this issue in EUSBSR, 
the second revision of the EUSBSR Action Plan included a whole chapter to clarify tasks and 
responsibilities among actors. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS 
This chapter aimed at providing an assembled analytical perspective of EU macro-regions. The main 
argument across this study is that EU macro-regions can be seen as hybrid models of organization which 
balance between territorial and functional interdependencies. Building on the distinction between territorial 
and functional spaces and informed by existing theoretical considerations, I attempted to illustrate the 
hybrid nature of EU macro-regions by looking into three analytical aspects (pre-existing institutions, 
substantive content of macro-regional strategies and governance structures). 
Concerning the first aspect, the overall conclusion on pre-existing institutions suggests that the Baltic and 
Alpine macro-regions build on (rich) existing cooperation, where both territorial and functional dimensions 
are already established. In contrast, the Danube macro-region does not have long tradition of cooperation, 
except the domain of navigation, while the Adriatic-Ionian case enjoys limited pre-existing support coming 
only from political cooperation. More specifically, the EUSBSR is seen to reinforce and systematize the 
cooperation between pre-existing institutions in the Baltic region. In particular, its contribution is identified 
into improving policy coordination. In the Danube macro-region, the EUSDR has provided a new 
momentum for dialogue and regional cooperation. Although the main area of cooperation in the Danube 
was historically the functional area of navigation, the EUSDR provides new opportunities for political and 
economic cooperation among countries expanding from the core of the Danube river up to the Western 
Balkans. In the Adriatic-Ionian macro-region, cooperation of pre-existing institutions was provoked by the 
territorial need to make Adriatic and Ionian countries ‘talk’ again after a long period of disputes and 
conflicts. This issue still remains crucial, moreover the EUSAIR seems to build on experiences gained by 
the AII in order to create new cooperation arrangements driven by functional independencies (e.g. blue 
economy, environment and tourism). Lastly, in the Alpine macro-region, there is a significant heritage of 
cooperation. Pre-existing organizations such as the Alpine Convention and CIPRA together with national 
and regional administrations in the Alps do provide territorial and functional focuses to EUSALP, which 
therefore needs to ensure the balance between all them. 
Considering the substantive content of macro-regional strategies, they all commence with a functional 
scope, which is to improve coordination and efficiency in a number of policy areas. However, territorial 
imperatives are also apparent in macro-regional strategies, especially the Danube and Adriatic-Ionian 
cases. This can be seen either by focusing on the integration process of non-EU countries in macro-
regional projects or by looking at the involvement of multiple actors from different territorial levels in various 
macro-regional processes. In more detail, the EUSBSR was initiated as a ‘European’ project in order to 
‘Clean’ the Baltic sea, but it soon broadened its pertinence to additional functional areas by incorporating 
non-EU countries. In the Danube macro-region, the main functional trigger was the issue of floods in the 
Danube river. Starting from this issue, EUSDR soon reflected a broader political vision towards building 
prosperity in the Danube region and opening its relations to the Western Balkans. Similar to the Danube 
case, the Adriatic-Ionian macro-region aims to promote economic and social prosperity as well as the 
accession and integration of Western Balkans. However, it was created from a different starting point. This 
starting point was pre-existing territorial relations under the AII, which are gradually developed in new 
functional forms of cooperation and networking. Obstacles to this trend seem to be the actual resources 
available as well as the political commitment of those involved. Turning to the Alpine case, the EUSALP is 
driven by a vision of prosperity which can be realized by a well-working functional coordination and 
governance. However, the realization of such a vision is threatened by incompatibility between EUSALP’s 
goals and the available funding. 
Concluding on the last aspect, the governance structures of macro-regional strategies are principally 
driven by functional interdependencies, while territorial interests are still evident. In particular, governance 
structures balance between high-level processes that ensure strategic supervision to the EU and national 
actors as well as operational processes by which governance mechanisms respond to policy-specific 
challenges. Certainly, the main logic in the architecture of governance structures may seem identical 
across macro-regions, since the main motivation behind it is to improve effectiveness at the high-political, 
national (coordination) and policy-specific (Implementation) levels. As a result, new governance 
mechanisms as well as working structures are created across all macro-regional strategies in order to 
solve organizational issues caused by different governance systems within participating countries. 
However differences in governance structures still exist depending on those involved and the resources 
available to them. Reasons explaining these differences are the limited level of commitment and 
leadership of actors, the limited allocation of human and financial resources and the gap between macro-
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regions as strategy tools and the implementation of cooperation programmes under already established 
streams of funding. A side but still relevant issue explaining differences in governance structures is multi-
level governance (MLG). According to empirical evidence, MLG works differently in each macro-region 
(Interview 4; 8). Moreover, MLG is linked to differences in governance structures either by pointing to 
different actors and how they affect governance processes or by challenging the bottom-up principle and 
how lower levels of government and policy implementation hinder governance processes in the higher 
levels (Interview 2; 3). 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHIC REFERENCES 
Barca, F. (2009). An agenda for a reformed cohesion policy: A place-based approach to meeting 
European Union challenges and expectations. Independent Report prepared at the request of Danuta 
Hübner, Commissioner for Regional Policy. Retrieved on December 16, 2016 from: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/regi/dv/barca_report_/barca_report_en.p
df 
Blatter, J. (2004). ‘From spaces of place’ to ‘spaces of flows’? Territorial and functional governance in 
cross-border regions in Europe and North America, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 
28(3), 530-548 
Cretu, C. (2016). Keynote speech of Commissioner Corina Cretu at the Opening session Baltic Forum, 8 
November 2016. Retrieved on December 16, 2016 from: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/2014-
2019/cretu/announcements/keynote-speech-commissioner-corina-cretu-opening-session-baltic-forum_en 
Dühr, S. (2011). Baltic Sea, Danube and Macro-Regional Strategies: A Model for Transnational 
Cooperation in the EU?, Study and Research 86, Notre Europe 
EC (2009). European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region. Communication from the Commission to 
the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee 
of the Regions, COM(2009) 248 final 
EC (2010). European Union Strategy for Danube Region. Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions, COM(2010) 715 final 
EC (2013). European Union Strategy for Danube Region. Report from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, COM(2013) 181 final 
EC (2014a). European Union Strategy for the Adriatic and Ionian Region. Communication from the 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the Regions, COM(2014) 357 final 
EC (2014b). The governance of macro-regional strategies. Report from the Commission to the European 
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, COM(2014) 284 final 
EC (2015a). European Union Strategy for the Alpine Region. Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions, COM(2015) 366 final 
EC (2015b). Action Plan. Commission staff working document, SWD(2015) 147 final. Accompanying the 
document COM(2015) 366 final 
EC (2016a). The implementation of EU macro-regional strategies. Report from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions, COM(2016) 805 final 
EC (2016b). The implementation of EU macro-regional strategies. Commission Staff Working Document 
SWD(2016) 443 final. Accompanying the document COM(2016) 805 final 
EP (2006). A Baltic Sea Region Strategy for the Northern Dimension. Report by the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, 2006/2171(INI). Retrieved on November 7, 2016 from: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A6-2006-
0367+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN 
EUSALP (2013). Political resolution towards a European Union Strategy for the Alpine region. Released in 
Grenoble, France (18.10.2013). Retrieved on May 29, 2017 from: http://www.alpine-
region.eu/sites/default/files/uploads/page/24/attachments/grenobleresolution.pdf 
 1678 
 
EUSALP (2014). Milan Declaration of the Alpine States and Regions. EUSALP Stakeholder Conference, 
Milan, 1st December 2014. Retrieved on January 31, 2017 from: 
http://www.oerok.gv.at/fileadmin/Bilder/2.Reiter-Raum_u._Region/4.Europ-
Raumentwicklung/Makroregionen/EUSALP/2014-12_EUSALP_Milan_Declaration_final.pdf 
Kern, K. and Gänzle, S. (2013). ‘Macro-regionalisation’ as a New Form of European Governance: The 
Case of the European Union’s Strategies for the Baltic Sea and the Danube Regions. ISL working paper. 
Retrieved on January 28, 2017 from: http://hdl.handle.net/11250/134924 
Moore, A. (2008). Rethinking scale as a geographical category: from analysis to practice, Progress in 
Human Geography, 32, 203-225 
Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2010). EU Strategy for the Danube Region- Brief history. Access on 
January 19, 2017, URL: http://www.mae.ro/en/node/2136 
Samecki, P. (2009). Macro-regional strategies in the European Union. Discussion paper. Retrieved on 
January 28, 2016 from: http://admin.interact-
eu.net/downloads/1682/Discussion_Paper_Macro_regional_strategies_in_the_European_Union_11_2009.
pdf 
Schymik, C. (2011). Blueprint for a macro-region- EU strategies for the Baltic Sea and Danube regions. 
SWP Research paper 10, Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs 
Stead, D. (2014). European integration and spatial rescaling in the Baltic Region: soft spaces, soft 
planning and soft security, European Planning Studies, 22(4), 680-693 
Stocchiero, A. (2010). Macro-Regions of Europe: Old Wine in a New Bottle? Background paper 65, Rome: 
CeSPI 
 
ANNEX 
 
 1679 
 
 
 
 
 
 
